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SPORTY'S FARM V. SPORTSMAN'S MARKET: A CASE
STUDY IN INTERNET REGULATION GONE AWRY*
Alanna C. Rutherford'
INTRODUCTION
A Brazilian friend told me a story about the fast-food res-
taurant Burger King's attempt to enter the Brazilian market.
Burger King created a marketing strategy and found producers
willing to enter into inexpensive contracts. Arrangements were
complete, but one thing had not been accounted for-Brazil
already had a Burger King fast-food chain. As a result, the
American chain was frustrated from entering into the Brazil-
ian fast-food market with the goodwill it had built for its inter-
nationally recognized name. This is just one example of the
importance of trademarks to daily business plans around the
world. It also represents the struggle that occurs daily on the
Internet.
More concretely, as companies use their trademarks to
direct commerce to their websites, domain names have become
the single most important commodity on the Internet.' This
booming industry, which at least one commentator has re-
ferred to as the "new gold standard," has led to a reawakening
of purpose in intellectual property law.2 However, because of
the first-come, first-served method of domain name registra-
tion, more established commercial players-who found them-
selves on the losing side of the gold rush-staked a claim to
the new gold mines using the old law of trademarks to catch
up.3 From this the doctrine of cybersquatting was born.
'©2000 Alanna C. Rutherford. All Rights Reserved.
t B.S.F.S., Georgetown University; J.D., Columbia University. The author
would like to thank Professor Lance Liebman, Columbia Law School, and Professor
Paul Schwartz, Brooklyn Law School, for providing her with the impetus to write
this Article.
' Jeremy D. Mishkin, Master of Your Domain: An Ouerview of the Anticyber-
squatting Consumer Protection Act, 18 SPG COiMi. LAW. 3, 3 (Spring 2000).
2 Id.
' Website addresses are alphanumeric representations of Internet protocol ad-
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In Sporty's Farm v. Sportsman's Market,4 a case involving
the intentional use of another's trademark as a domain name
to benefit from the name's goodwill, Judge Guido Calabresi
defines cybersquatting as involving "the registration as domain
names of well-known trademarks by non-trademark holders
who then try to sell the names back to the trademark own-
ers."5 However, cybersquatting involves much more than
Judge Calabresi intimates. It involves a fundamental shift in
the way one values property and conceives of trademark law.
In Sporty's Farm, Judge Calabresi did much more than in-
crease the legitimacy of the cybersquatting doctrine; he also
provided the first appellate court review of the
Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (the "ACPA" or
the "Act").6 The significance of this case resonates both with
Calabresi and the other judges who presided over Sporty's
Farm.' The particulars of the case are unique, but it will
stand as a harbinger for things to come.8 As such, while the
ACPA seems like an easy solution for an easy problem-the
purposeful use of another's trademark to divert busi-
ness-there are both structural and regulatory problems asso-
ciated with the Act that cast doubt on whether it can have
more than limited effectiveness. While not a prominent factor
in the Second Circuit's decision, the Sporty's Farm opinion
does repeatedly note the uniqueness of the fact pattern to the
dresses, which are a series of numbers separated by periods, such as
129.47.231.36. Words were used instead of numbers because of the difficulty in
remembering the numbers. See Department of Commerce's White Paper on the
Management of Internet Names and Addresses, 63 Fed. Reg. 31,741, 31,741 (1998)
[hereinafter White Paper].
4 202 F.3d 489 (2d. Cir. 2000).
5 Id. at 493.
' Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113,
113 Stat. 1501 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1116, 1117, 1125(d),
1127, 1129 (2000)). The purpose of the ACPA is:
[T]o protect consumers and American businesses, to promote the growth
of online commerce, and to provide clarity in the law for trademark own-
ers by prohibiting the bad-faith and abusive registration of distinctive
marks as Internet domain names with the intent to profit from the good-
will associated with such marks-a practice commonly referred to as
cybersquatting.
S. REP. No. 106-140, at 4.
' "[Olur opinion appears to be the first interpretation of the [Anticyber-
squatting Protection Act] at the appellate level." Sporty's Farm, 202 F.3d at 496.
8 See infra Parts III & IV.
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cybersquatting issue. Nonetheless, perhaps, Sporty's Farm
misses the true significance of the Act in the radical shift the
case presents for trademark law and regulation.9
Part I of this Article provides a brief history of
cybersquatting and the cybersquatting doctrine as it developed
and culminated into the new law. Part II details the facts,
procedural and legal history, and analysis of the Sporty's Farm
case. Parts III and IV examine the potential future implica-
tions associated with the Sporty's Farm case in particular and
the ACPA in general. Specifically, Part III addresses the struc-
tural challenges facing intellectual property through the codifi-
cation of cybersquatting and the definitional shift the
cybersquatting doctrine requires to several key concepts in
trademark law. Part IV attempts to introduce the regulatory
hazards facing the ACPA by revisiting the oft-asked question
of whether the Internet can be regulated, and, if it can, wheth-
er we are taking the right regulatory approach. Finally, the
Conclusion demonstrates that the Second Circuit's decision is
simply indicative of things to come. The Sporty's Farm decision
demonstrates the Act's ability to fit neatly into the easy ques-
tions that the law poses, but upon further analysis it reveals
gaping holes in our ability to regulate this area of the law
without significant shifts in approach and illustrates the
breaking point of trademark law concepts stretched too thin.
I. BRIEF HISTORY OF CYBERSQUATTING
Before Congress passed the ACPA, courts were faced with
the issue of how to apply old, pre-Internet law to new technolo-
gy and the problems that the integration of the two presented.
Some courts were reluctant to deal with the issues presented
by cybersquatting without a legislative dictate, and they sum-
marily dismissed all cases dealing with the issue.' ° Other
courts took a half-century old doctrine called "dilution," borne
' "The most important grounds for our holding that Sporty's Farm acted with
a bad faith intent, however, are the unique circumstances of this case, which do
not fit neatly into the specific factors enumerated by Congress but may neverthe-
less be considered under the statute." Sporty's Farm, 202 F.3d at 499.
1" See Michael D. Bednarek, Cyberpirates, Beware: Recent Anti-cybersquatting
Law Provides New Deterrence Tools but Does Not Solve All Problems, 22 NAT'L
L.J., Jan. 31, 2000, at C1.
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of a law review article," that was witnessing a revival in the
law. This revival culminated in a 1995 amendment to the
Lanham Act that added Section 1125, which formalized dilu-
tion of trademark. 2 The principal goal of trademark law is to
protect consumers from confusion and deception.13 Dilution
assists in this protection by guarding the capacity of a famous
mark to identify and distinguish goods and services, regardless
of competition or likelihood of confusion."
Traditionally, dilution was acknowledged in two forms;
blurring and tarnishment."5 Blurring is the oldest form of di-
lution, and it is premised on the eroding of a trademark's
uniqueness caused by the junior user employing the mark or
one substantially similar to it to identify his goods.' 6 The idea
behind this is that eventually the trademark will lose all dis-
tinctiveness because of its association with a wide variety of
goods and services. 7 Dilution theory strives to protect the in-
vestment by the trademark holder in building a name and
reputation for his mark with which consumers can identify. 8
As dilution's originator stated, "[Ihf you allow Rolls Royce res-
" Dilution theory is commonly attributed to Frank I. Schechter. See Frank I.
Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV. 813, 825
(1927). However, there is reason to believe that he was not the advocate that
many believed him to be. See Kristine M. Boylan, The Corporate Right of Publicity
in Federal Dilution Legislation, Part II, 82 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOCY, 5,
24-26 (2000).
2 The Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1127 (2000), is the federal trademark
law and includes the ratification of the Trademark Law Treaty.
"' See FRANcIS H. UPTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TRADEMARKS WITH A
DIGEST AND REVIEW OF THE ENGLISH AND AMERICAN AUTHORITIES 17, 28-29 (1860).
1 15 U.S.C. § 1127. Or, in the words of its first advocate, dilution is the
"gradual whittling away or dispersion of the identity and hold upon the public
mind of the mark or name." Schechter, supra note 11, at 825 (calling for stan-
dardized protection of marks.) Schechter recognized that the power of a mark
rested in its uniqueness and singularity within the market. Therefore, even a
noncompeting product, by someone other than the mark holder, damaged the
mark. See Schechter, supra note 11, at 830-32.
" For a general discussion on dilution, see generally Boylan, supra note 11.
'6 See Elliot B. Staffin, The Dilution Doctrine: Towards A Reconciliation with
the Lanham Act, 6 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 105, 117-118
(1995).
17 See 3 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
§ 24.13 (4th ed. 2000).
'8 See id. at § 24.90. While traditional trademark law rests primarily on a
policy of protecting customers from mistake and deception, anti-dilution law more
closely resembles an absolute property right in a trademark. See id.
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taurants, and Rolls Royce cafeterias, and Rolls Royce pants,
and Rolls Royce candy, in ten years you will not have the Rolls
Royce mark anymore." 9 So, although consumer confusion is
not the basis for granting this type of protection, it remains an
underlying concern. Tarnishment is based on a similar theory
that represents the harm to "the positive, quality-connoting
associations the holder has labored to create through advertise-
ment and promotion."" The move towards dilution as a meth-
od of handling the burgeoning legal questions presented by
new technology was sparked by legislative comments made by
Senator Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.) in 1995. He stated, "[Ilt is my
hope that this anti-dilution statute can help stem the use of
deceptive Internet addresses taken by those who are choosing
marks that are associated with the products and reputations of
others."2
Senator Leahy's hopes were realized in Panavision v.
Toeppen" In Panavision, the Ninth Circuit created the most
succinct pronouncement of the doctrine under which
cybersquatters are liable.' Dennis Toeppen, a visionary of the
Internet's future commercial exploitation, registered a variety
of domain names of well-known companies, including Delta
Airlines, Neiman Marcus, and Eddie Bauer.24 Panavision sent
a letter stating that Toeppen's website, www.panavision.com,
which contained a photo of Pana, Illinois, infringed upon its
registered trademarkY Toeppen agreed to settle the matter
for $13,000, which is significantly more than the $100 it cost to
register the name with Network Solutions, Inc. ("NSI"), the
clearinghouse for domain names." The court examined the
case under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act (the
19 Staffim, supra note 16, at 118 (quoting a statement made by Frank
Schechter). The legislative history behind New York's state dilution claim is also
helpful in this regard with references to hypothetical violations such as DuPont
shoes, Buick aspirin tablets, Schlitz varnish, Kodak pianos, Bulova gowns, etc. See
N.Y. LEGIS. LAW § 49-50 (McKinney 1954).
2 Staffin, supra note 16, at 131.
21 141 CONG. REC. 19312-01 (daily ed. Dec. 29, 1995) (Statement of Sen.
Leahy).
22 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998).
2 Id.
24 Id. at 1319.
2 Id.
26 Id. at 1318.
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"FTDA").
To prove a violation of the FTDA, a plaintiff must show
that (1) the mark is famous, (2) the defendant is making a
commercial use of the mark, (3) the defendant's use began
after the mark became famous, and (4) the defendant's use of
the mark dilutes the quality of the mark by diminishing the
capacity of the mark to identify and distinguish goods and
services.2" Noncommercial use, comparative advertising, news
reports, and criticism are not considered forms of dilution.29
The defendant did not debate the fame of the trademark.
Moreover, the law had previously established that there must
be more than mere registration of the mark to be considered a
use in commerce." So, the court recast Toeppen's acts by re-
ferring to him as a "spoiler" who prevented Panavision, among
others, from receiving the goodwill of its name while doing
business on the Internet.3 The court found that by trading on
the "spoilation" value of the marks and attempting to arbitrage
the name, the commercial use requirement was met.32 The
2 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2000). That Section states in relevant parts:
In determining whether a mark is distinctive and famous, a court may
consider factors such as, but not limited to-
(A) the degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the mark;
(B) the duration and extent of use of the mark in connection with the
goods and services with which the mark is used;
(C) the duration and extent of advertising and publicity of the mark;
(D) the geographical extent of the trading area in which the mark is
used;
(E) the channels of trade for the goods or services with which the mark
is used;
(F) the degree of recognition of the mark in the trading areas and chan-
nels of trade used by the mark's owner and the person against whom the
injunction is sought;
(G) the nature and extent of use of the same or similar marks by third
parties.
Id. § 1125(c)(1)(A)-(G).
2 See Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1324 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)).
29 See generally JANE C. GINSBURG ET AL., TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR COMPETI-
TION LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 735-771 (1996 & Supp. 1999).
"' Acad. of Motion Picture Arts & Scis. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 989 F.
Supp. 1276, 1279 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (holding that mere registration does not consti-
tute commercial use); Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 985 F.
Supp. 949, 957 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (holding that registration is not commercial use
within the meaning of the Trademark Dilution Act).
31 Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1325.
32 Toeppen made a commercial use of Panavision's trademarks even though he
did not attach the marks to a product. Toeppen's commercial use was his attempt
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court affirmed the district court's summary judgment in favor
of Panavision by stating that arbitrage is a commercial use
and that on the Internet, the domain name, though little more
than an address, has significant value considering that the
name seems to connote to customers information about the
site.33 Furthermore, Judge Thompson clearly stated that "to
find dilution, a court need not rely on the traditional defini-
tions such as 'blurring' and 'tarnishment.' "14 Thus, in the
space of a few lines, a new form of dilution that would later be
referred to as "cybersquatter dilution" was born.35 It was spe-
cific to the diminishment of the capacity to identify and distin-
guish goods on the Internet.36
This Panavision or cybersquatter dilution theory prevailed
not only through a series of cases, but also against both squat-
ters and legal registrants in a series of private transactions
that led to the handing over of dozens of trademark domain
name sites." However, worried about both real and potential
lack of uniformity in the law at various levels from jurisdiction
to potential remedies, many businesses pushed for federal law
that would uniformly signal the death knell of cybersquatters.
So, on November 29, 1999, President Clinton signed the ACPA
to sell the trademarks themselves. Id.
' Id. at 1327 n.8.
4 Id. at 1326.
S "Courts presented with the question have held unanimously that it does
'lessen the capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods and servic-
es,' when someone other than the trademark holder registers the trademark name
as an Internet domain name." Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 999 F. Supp.
1337, 1340 (C.D. Cal. 1998), rev'd, 189 F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting 15 U.S.C.
§ 1127 (1996)); see also Hasbro, Inc., v. Clue Computing, Inc., 66 F. Supp. 2d 117,
132 (D. Mass. 1999).
" Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1326 (citing Teletech Customer Care Mgmt., Inc. v.
Tele-Tech Co., 977 F. Supp. 1407, 1412 (C.D. Cal. 1997)).
17 It is unclear whether these transactions were entirely positive, as they al-
lowed high-priced corporate attorneys to bully a number of businesses and individ-
uals with legitimate claims to domain names into surrendering them. The confu-
sion over the registration system often led to a phenomenon called "reverse hijack-
ing," where essentially the aforementioned would occur with trademark holders,
forcing those with legitimate title to a domain name to surrender it. See Rebecca
W. Gole, Note, Playing the Name Game: A Glimpse at the Future of the Internet
Domain Name System, 51 FED. COMi. L.J. 403, 412 (1999); see also Mark
Grossman & Allison K. Hift, Is the Cybersquatting Cure Worse than the Disease,
LEGAL TImES, Jan. 24, 2000, at 24 (referring to one of the most famous examples
of reverse hijacking-the attempt of the makers of Gumby and Pokey toys to take
away the domain name from a twelve-year-old child nicknamed Pokey).
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into law. 8 The Act provided two significant measures. First,
it codified the Panavision approach to cybersquatting. Second,
and more importantly, it provided that owners of marks could
file an in rem civil action against a domain name rather than
against the domain name holder." This provision was in di-
rect response to Porsche Cars North America v. Porsche.com, °
a case decided shortly before the Act was ratified.
The Act, which amends 15 U.S.C. § 1125, states in rele-
vant part:
A person shall be liable in a civil action by the owner of a mark,
including a personal name which is protected as a mark under this
section, if, without regard to the goods or services of the parties,
that person-(i) has a bad faith intent to profit from that mark,
including a personal name which is protected as a mark under this
section; and (ii) registers, traffics in, or uses a domain name [that is
confusingly similar]. 4'
The ACPA goes on to list a series of factors to consider with
regard to the distinctiveness or fame of the mark. The Act also
added cyberpiracy42 protection for individuals, which seeks to
protect those with famous names from having others capitalize
on their fame by registering and using websites bearing their
names.43 A good faith exception is built into this latter provi-
sion." Finally, the ACPA provides for either statutory (rang-
38 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2000); see also Bednarek, supra note 10, at C1.
39 Id. § 1125(d)(2)(A). It is important to note that an in rem action against the
domain names will result in most proceedings occurring in the Eastern District of
Virginia because it is NSI's locale. It will be interesting to see what the court,
which previously questioned the constitutionality of in rem actions against domain
names, does with the new ACPA laws.
40 51 F. Supp. 2d 707 (E.D. Va. 1999). The plaintiffs in Porsche Cars N. Am.
brought an in rem action against 128 registered domain names that they alleged
were similar or identical to their trademarks. The district court dismissed the
complaint, stating that the federal dilution laws did not provide for in rem actions
and that reading these intentions into the law would put into doubt the constitu-
tionality of the dilution law. Id. at 712. It also stated that "courts generally can-
not exercise in rem jurisdiction to adjudicate the status of property unless the Due
Process Clause would have permitted in personam jurisdiction over those who have
an interest in the res." Id. Many have commented on the likelihood that the in
rem jurisdictional provision in the law is directly related to this decision. See
Wiley, Rein & Fielding, Controversial Anti-Cybersquatting Measure Becomes Law,
at
http://www.wrf'comlpublications/cyberspace/cybersquatting.html.
41 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A).
42 "Cyberpiracy" is simply the original term used to describe cybersquatting.
15 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1)(A).
4 See id. § 1129(b)(1)(B). Although this Article will not address 15 U.S.C.
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ing from $1,000-$100,000) or actual damages and profits, the
collection of which serves as another incentive for squatters to
return domain names.45 In this new world of greater sophisti-
cation towards the Internet, the Second Circuit embarked on
the task of becoming the first circuit court to review the ACPA.
II. SPORTY'S FARM V. SPORTSMAN'S MARKET, INC.
A. Facts
In the 1960s, Sportsman's Market, Inc. began using the
logo "Sporty's" to identify its catalogues, which sold specialty
products to pilots and aviation enthusiasts to whom the mark
§ 1129, which deals with the registration of personal names, it is worth noting
that celebrities from John Tesh to Julia Roberts have recently either won or set-
tled cases involving the use of their names as web addresses. See John Tesh Sues
for Trademark Infringement and Cybersquatting, E-COImMERCE LAW WEEKLY, (Jan.
31, 2000), at http://www.entnewsnetwork.com/techlaw/news; Emily Farache, Julia
Roberts Wins Namesake URL, at http'//www.eonline.com/News/Items/0,1,6561,00.-
html. While a good faith exception is built into the law to protect fan sites, the
Act is unclear on whether that good faith exception would be converted if those
fans chose, for example, to enter commerce by selling a monthly newsletter. What
happens, as the trend is now developing, when stars register their names as
trademarks? Most importantly, do the rules of first-come, first served continue to
apply? One prominent example is the case of President George W. Bush, Jr. He
filed a complaint with the Federal Elections Commission based on a parody site,
gwbush.com. See Wayne Slater, Bush Criticizes Web Site as Malicious, THE DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, May 22, 1999, at Al. Although the case never went to court, it
appears that the site was legally entitled to be there as a matter of free speech,
even though the site's appearance had to be altered somewhat to clearly illustrate
that it was not the official site of the "Bush for President" campaign. However, if
the site sells t-shirts or buttons, it is not at all clear that it does not fall under
the Act and that Bush could not bring a case against the current registrants. Of
course, courts are likely to read the common exceptions to trademark infringement,
including parody and nominative fair use, into the Act as necessary. The new law
does, however, put a great deal of fan and parody sites at risk. See generally
Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Productions, Inc., 73 F.3d 497 (2d Cir. 1996)
(illustrating the parody exception to trademark infringement); see also New Kids
on the Block v. News Am. Publ'g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 308 (9th Cir. 1991) (defining
nominative use as "where the only word reasonably available to describe a particu-
lar thing is pressed into service-lies outside the strictures of trademark law . . .
because it does not imply sponsorship or endorsement by the trademark holder").
The result of this continued series of litigation may be that parody, critique,
and fan websites will be required to have in their domain name a clear indication
of their purpose. See Lucent Techs., Inc., v. Lucentsucks.com, 95 F. Supp. 2d 528
(E.D. Va. 2000).
"5 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d).
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was well known. The plaintiffs company distributed 18 million
catalogs across the country and received revenue of roughly
$50 million per year.46 In 1985, Sportsman's Market regis-
tered the "Sporty's" trademark and used the mark both in its
phone number and in $10 million worth of advertising done
yearly4
7
The defendants, Milton and Betty Hollander, own Omega,
a mail-order company that sells scientific process measurement
and control equipment. In 1994 to 1995, the company's owners
decided to enter the aviation catalog business, and they devel-
oped a wholly-owned subsidiary called Pilot's Depot.4 Shortly
thereafter, Omega registered a website, www.sportys.com, with
NSI.49 In January, 1996, Milton Hollander and his wife sold
the rights to the domain name to Sporty's Farm for a sum of
$16,200. Sporty's Farm, another wholly-owned subsidiary of
Omega, grew and sold Christmas trees." Mr. Hollander also
happened to be a pilot who received the Sportsman's catalogs,
and thus, he was aware of the Sporty's logo. When asked how
the company selected the name Sporty's Farm for their Christ-
mas tree business, the CEO of Omega, Ralph Michel, explained
that it came from a fond childhood memory of his uncle's farm
in upstate New York, which he referred to as "Spotty's Farm,"
after a dog named "Spotty." Somehow, "Sporty's Farm" became
the subsequent derivation of this name, even though the
Hollander's neither knew Mr. Michel's childhood pet nor had
any plans to start a Christmas tree business when they first
registered www.sportys.com.51
B. The District Court Opinion
After Sportsman's Market demanded that Omega cease
using the "Sporty's" domain, Sporty's Farm filed an action for
declaratory and injunctive relief in the Federal District Court
of Connecticut." Sportsman's Market filed a counterclaim al-
'6 Sporty's Farm, 202 F.3d at 493.
4, The international toll free number was 1-800-4SPORTYS and the domestic
number was 1-800-SPORTYS. See id. at 494.
48 Id.
4" At the time, NSI was the only registrant of domain names. Id. at 493.
' Id. at 494.
Sporty's Farm, 202 F.3d at 494.
s' Sporty's Farm, LLC v. Sportsman's Market, Inc., No. 3:96CV0756, slip op. at
[Vol. 66: 2
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leging violations of the Lanham Act,53 the Connecticut Unfair
Trade Practices Act,54 and common law tenets concerning
trademark infringement and unfair competition. Sportsman's
Market also sought injunctive relief, punitive damages,
plaintiffs profits, and attorney's fees and costs. 5
Addressing each of the claims in turn, Chief Judge Covello
first analyzed whether use of the domain name constituted
infringement.5 After stating that "[1likelihood of confusion is
the essential element" for trademark infringement to exist,57
the judge proceeded to use the Second Circuit's traditional
eight-factor test, commonly referred to as the Polaroid factors,
to determine the likelihood of confusion.5" He concluded that
the test had not been met, and thus, he found no infringement
because of the distinct products.59
The majority of the court's opinion focuses on dilution. In
fact, the judge begins by stating:
Prior to the adoption of the FTDA, a federal claim for the use of a
trademark required a showing of a "likelihood of confusion." Under
the FTDA, however, once it is determined that a mark is famous, a
senior user need only show that its mark is diluted by the junior
user's use of the same or similar mark."
Under the standard, the trademark owner must prove that the
mark is famous and that the mark has been diluted. In estab-
lishing the fame of the "Sporty's" mark, the judge looked at the
company's worldwide distribution of 18 million catalogs; the
5-6 (D. Conn. Mar. 13, 1998).
15 U.S.C. §§ 1051 et seq. (2000).
CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 42-110(b) et seq. (West Supp. 1999).
05 Sporty's Farm, No. 3:960V0756, slip op. at 1.
6 Id. at 6-11.
57 Id. at 8.
" The factors are (1) the strength of the mark, (2) the degree of similarity, (3)
the proximity of the products, (4) the likelihood that the prior owner of the mark
will "bridge the gap" between its products and the products of the infringer, (5)
actual confusion, (6) the alleged infringer's good faith in adopting the mark, (7)
the quality of the alleged infringer's product, and (8) the sophistication of the
buyers. Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs., 287 F.2d 492, 495-96 (2d Cir. 1961).
Sporty's Farm, No. 3:96CV0756, slip op. at 9.
s Id. at 12. Judge Covello goes on to quote, " 'Thus, the . .. [FTDA] signifi-
cantly expanded the reach of the Lanham Act by creating new obligations, impos-
ing new duties, and attaching new disabilities with respect to marks already
adopted.' " Id. at 1 (quoting Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. OfficeMax, 949 F. Supp.
409, 414 (E.D. Va. 1996)) (alteration in original).
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company's revenues of $50 million; its toll free number, which
contains the moniker; and Sportsman's Market's home base,
Clermont County, Ohio, in which the federal authorities at the
airport have named a non-directional radio beacon
"Sporty's."61 Since dilution was the only element of the case
decided in the defendant's favor, and since the court did not
find any willful intent to trade on the name, Sportsman's Mar-
ket was only granted injunctive relief.2
C. The Second Circuit Opinion
The most significant occurrence between the time the
district court case was decided on March 13, 1998 and the time
it was appealed to the Second Circuit was the ACPA's enact-
ment. Judge Calabresi, writing for the unanimous three-judge
panel that took a more cynical approach to the case, begins the
opinion with a brief history of the Internet and cybersquatting,
and then he provides a detailed history of the use of the
"Sporty's" trademark as the domain sportys.com.63
The suspicious factual and the unique legal situation sur-
rounding the case places the court in a position of deciding a
case with, what Calabresi refers to as, "three distinct fea-
tures."64 First, this was the first appellate level interpretation
of the ACPA. Second, the Second Circuit was interpreting the
statute, even though the ruling at the district court level was
based on the previous incarnation of that particular section of
the law-the FTDA. Finally, Calabresi realized that this case's
fact-pattern was highly unusual and unlikely to reoccur.6"
Because the district court's findings and the record were so
clear, the panel believed it appropriate to apply the newly
enacted ACPA to this case because it was intended in part to
resolve these types of issues.66 Under the new Act, the court
61 Sporty's Farm, No. 3:96cV0756, slip op. at 15-16.
62 Id. at 20-21.
6 As the circuit court points out, apostrophes are not symbols recognized as
domain names; therefore, for all intents and purposes, the domain names "sporty's"
and "sportys" are equivalent. See Sporty's Farm, 202 F.3d at 492 n.2.
" Id. at 496.
" See id.
" Id. at 496-97.
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had to decide whether the mark was distinctive or famous.
After using the standard test for distinctiveness-requiring
that the mark be used for an extended period of time, nation-
wide, and in a wide variety of retail channels-the court con-
cluded that the "Sporty's" mark was sufficiently distinctive."
Turning to the second part of the new statutory test, the court
easily found that the mark was identical or confusingly similar
to the domain name.69 Thus, the next determination was
whether there was a bad faith intent to profit from the mark
by using it as a registered domain name.70
The ACPA lists nine factors that one may consider in this
analysis. 1 Utilizing these factors and the weight of the re-
See id. at 497; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A) (2000).
See Sporty's Farm, 202 F.3d at 497. The distinctiveness test satisfies
§ 1125(d)(1)(A)(ii)(I) of the Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1)(A)-(E) for the distinctive-
ness test.
6 This confusion element satisfies § 1125(d)(1)(A)(ii)(I) of the Act. See Sporty's
Farm, 202 F.3d at 497-98.
70 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(i).
71 Id. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i). The factors to determine whether a person has a bad
faith intent are the following:
(I) the trademark or other intellectual property rights of the person, if
any, in the domain name;
(II) the extent to which the domain name consists of the legal name of
the person or a name that is otherwise commonly used to identify that
person;
(III) the person's prior use, if any, of the domain name in connection
with the bona fide offering of any goods or services;
(IV) the person's bona fide noncommercial or fair use of the mark in a
site accessible under the domain name;
(V) the person's intent to divert consumers from the mark owner's online
location to a site accessible under the domain name that could harm the
goodwill represented by the mark, either for commercial gain or with the
intent to tarnish or disparage the mark, by creating a likelihood of confu-
sion as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation, or endorsement of the site;
(VI) the person's offer to transfer, sell, or otherwise assign the domain
name to the mark owner or any third party for financial gain without
having used, or having an intent to use, the domain name in the bona
fide offering of any goods or services, or the person's prior conduct indi-
cating a pattern of such conduct;
(VII) the person's provision of material and misleading false contact infor-
mation when applying for the registration of the domain name, the
person's intentional failure to maintain accurate contact information, or
the person's prior conduct indicating a pattern of such conduct;
(VIII) the person's registration or acquisition of multiple domain names
which the person knows are identical or confusingly similar to marks of
others that are distinctive at the time of registration of such domain
names, or dilutive of famous marks of others that are famous at the
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
cord, the court stated that " 'no reasonable factfinder could
return a verdict against' Sportsman."72 This decision is based
on the facts that (1) neither Omega nor its subsidiaries had
any intellectual property rights to sportys.com, (2) the
"Sporty's" mark is distinctive, (3) the domain was registered to
Omega before the Christmas tree business existed, and the site
remained unused until after the litigation began, (4) Omega
sold the mark to Sporty's Farm under suspicious circumstanc-
es, and (5) Sporty's Farm did not claim that its use was a non-
commercial or fair use, which would serve as a mitigating fac-
tor under the Act.73 The court notes that, notwithstanding all
of these factors, the unique circumstances of the case provide
the greatest condemnation of the defendants and do not neatly
fit into Congress' factors.74 Consequently, the court affirmed
the district court's decision to issue an injunction without dam-
ages, indicating that it is unclear that the domain name's reg-
istration could constitute willful dilution given the law's uncer-
tain state.75
Despite the court's condemnation of the defendants, under
the ACPA, judges do not and cannot provide an award for
damages, which is what gives the legislation its teeth. In the
end, the court decides, as the district court did, that an injunc-
tion is the only remedy available to the plaintiffs even though
the court found "that there is more than enough evidence in
the record below of 'bad faith intent to profit,' "76 it ruled that
the ACPA damages section cannot apply retroactively. More-
over, it stated that the Connecticut "cigarette rule" on damag-
es, which would provide for a finding of damages under the
new law despite its inapplicability to the case, also does not
apply.77
time of registration of such domain names, without regard to the goods
or services of the parties; and
(IX) the extent to which the mark incorporated in the person's domain
name registration is or is not distinctive and famous within the meaning
of subsection (c)(1) of section 43.
Id.
72 Sporty's Farm, 202 F.3d at 498 (citations omitted).
13 Id. at 499.
74 Id.
7' Id. at 500-01.
' Id. at 498 (citation omitted).
See Sporty's Farm, 202 F.3d at 501. The cigarette rule asks the following
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Ultimately, the application of a novel law does not look so
new, as it provides the same old remedy that courts have
adopted from the FTDA. Perhaps Sporty's Farm will stand as
an exception, and the coincidental timing is what leaves the
case standing in the never-never land of remedies. However,
perhaps it is a good indication of things to come, and it begs
the question of whether the ACPA is as effective a weapon
against cybersquatting as it was hoped to be.
D. Future Implications From the Second Circuit's Decision
The potential implications of Sporty's Farm are numerous,
illustrating both the structural and regulatory limits of the law
that the case seeks to apply. The Second Circuit noted that the
fact pattern did not neatly lend itself to the mold Congress
created in the ACPA with its nine-factor list to detect
cybersquatting. The list is based on some of the major case law
and pre-existing intellectual property theories."8 And, frankly,
Sporty's Farm was an easy case because the defendant demon-
strated excessive bad faith in its use of the mark. Prospective
cases are likely to be much more complicated and to pose legal
questions that not only implicate trademark law, but also
implicate jurisdictional and constitutional issues.
III. STRUCTURAL ISSUES: THE METAMORPHOSIS OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW
The structural issues presented by the ACPA are mostly
those of definition in that they beg the question: how far will
questions in determining whether damages should be awarded for unfair or decep-
tive practices in trade or commerce:
1) Whether the practice, without necessarily having been previously con-
sidered unlawful, offends public policy as it has been established by stat-
utes, the common law, or otherwise-whether, in other words, it is with-
in at least the penumbra of some common law, statutory, or other estab-
lished concept of unfairness; 2) whether it is immoral, unethical, oppres-
sive, or unscrupulous; 3) whether it causes substantial injury to consum-
ers [competitors or other businessmen] ....
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-110b(b) (West Supp. 1999). All three criteria need not
be satisfied. Rather, a practice may be unfair because of the degree to which it
meets one of the criteria. Saturn Constr. Co. v. Premier Roofing Co., 680 A.2d
1274, 1283 (Conn. 1996).
78 Mishkin, supra note 1, at 5.
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intellectual property rights extend? This Part will analyze the
trademark theories of dilution and concurrent use as applied to
cybersquatting and ask whether the definitional shift brought
on by attempts to adapt the law to new technologies has
spread these theories too thin.
Trademark law grants businesses the exclusive right to
make use of a word, symbol, name, or device on products to
protect consumers from confusion and deception.79 It does not,
however, give anyone the exclusive right to use a word. If the
trademark is a famous mark, as previously described, it re-
ceives additional protection in the form of a court injunction to
prevent non-confusing, commercial uses of the trademark that
undermine the value of the mark." This diminishment of val-
ue is known as dilution, and it is the basis for cybersquatting
protection. The focus of trademark law shifts from the protec-
tion of consumer interests to the protection of economic invest-
ment.81
"' See Construction and definitions, intent of chapter, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1994)
(defining the term trademark); see also Fed. Express Corp. v. Fed. Espresso, Inc.,
201 F.3d 168, 174 (2d Cir. 2000) ("The hallmark of infringement in violation of [15
U.S.C. § 1125 (a)(1)] is likelihood of confusion."); UPTON, supra note 13, at 707;
Boylan, supra note 11, at 6; Kenneth B. Germain, Recent Trademark Decisions,
PLI's THIRD ANNUAL INSTITUTE FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 707 (1997);
Jessica Litman, The DNS Wars: Trademarks and the Internet Domain Name Sys-
tem, 4 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 149, 153 (Spring 2000).
8o The Federal Express Corp. court wrote:
In sum, in order to prevail on a dilution claim a plaintiff is not required
to prove likelihood of confusion. Trademark dilution statutes are designed
to "cover those situations where the public knows that the defendant is
not connected to or sponsored by the plaintiff, but the ability of the
plaintiffs mark to serve as a unique identifier of the plaintiffs goods or
services is weakened because the relevant public now also associates that
designation with a new and different source .... Thus, where the clas-
sic likelihood of confusion test leaves off, the dilution theory begins."
Fed. Express Corp., 201 F.3d at 175 (quoting Sports Auth., Inc. v. Prime Hospitali-
ty Corp., 89 F.3d 955, 965-66 (2d Cir. 1996)); see also supra Part I for further
analysis.
81 "While traditional trademark law rests primarily on a policy of protection of
customers from mistake and deception, anti-dilution law more closely resembles an
absolute property right in a trademark." MCCARTHY, supra note 17, at § 24.90; see
also Boylan, supra note 11, at 5.
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A. Dilution Theory
The cybersquatting law attempts to protect Internet trade-
marks from dilution. The ACPA represents an expansion of the
FTDA, and it is a law that many jurists already find trou-
bling.82 A myriad of intellectual property scholars have criti-
cized dilution theory's application as moving away from the
original purpose of trademark law-preventing consumer con-
fusion. 3 According to critics, instead of preventing consumer
confusion, dilution promotes economic investment above all
else.' Considering this background, it would seem that the
ACPA further erodes the basis for trademark law. Until No-
vember 1999, one had to prove that a mark was both distinc-
tive 5 and famous to obtain dilution protection.86 While
trademark law was expanded in the early cybersquatting cas-
es, such as Panavision, it now seems that there is a codifying
of the law at the lowest common denominator. Under the
2 "This case requires [one] to interpret and apply the dauntingly elusive con-
cept of trademark 'dilution' as now embodied in the [FTDAI." Ringling Bros.-
Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel Dev., 170 F.3d
449, 451 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding that dilution under the FTDA requires proof of
the requisite mental association and that such association causes actual harm to
the ability of the mark to identify and distinguish the goods and services in com-
merce); see also Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 189 F.3d 868, 875 (9th Cir.
1999) (noting that dilution is a claim "Ii]nvented and reserved for a select class of
marks-those marks with such powerful consumer associations that even non-com-
peting uses can impinge on their value"); I.P. Lund Trading v. Kohler Co., 163
F.3d 27, 46 (1st Cir. 1998) (stating that the fame requirement may only be satis-
fied by "truly prominent and renowned" marks).
' See generally Boylan, supra note 11; Kathleen B. McCabe, Dilution-By-Blur-
ring: A Theory Caught in the Shadow of Trademark Infringement, 68 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1827 (2000); see also John D. Mercer, Note, Cybersquatting: Blackmail on the
Information Superhighway, 6 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 1, 9-17 (2000).
For an in depth analysis of the arguments made against dilution, see gener-
ally Boylan, supra note 11.
' "Distinctiveness is often defined by courts as uniqueness or as the trait the
mark attains once it has acquired secondary meaning." James Robert Hughes, The
Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995 and the Evolution of the Dilution Doc-
trine: Is It Truly A Rational Basis for the Protection of Trademarks?, 1998 DET.
C.L. MICH. ST. U. L. REV. 759, 768 (1998); see also Robert N. Klieger, Trademark
Dilution: The Whittling Away of the Rational Basis for Trademark Protection, 58
U. PITT. L. REV. 789, 831 (1997) (stating that generally distinctiveness served as a
threshold requirement for the ability to make a dilution claim).
86 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2000); see also id. § 1125(c)(1)(A)-(H) (listing fac-
tors to take into consideration when a mark becomes famous); MCCARTHY, supra
note 17, at § 24.14.
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ACPA, the plaintiff need only prove that the mark is distinc-
tive or famous, and the standard for what constitutes either
seems to be lower than ever before." However, proving that
something is famous is a more stringent standard than that for
distinctive, which is really the most basic requirement for
trademark protection. Moreover, there does not seem to be a
particular standard by which courts measure fame. Usually,
surveys of the general public are used to establish a mark's
fame.8 While the statute espouses a list of factors for one to
consider regarding whether a mark is famous and distinctive,
the courts are not limited to that list.8 Indeed, courts may
vary as to whether a remedy for dilution is granted, with the
exception of some of the most recognizable brand names.
Many courts have commented on this heightened standard
requirement for winning dilution cases ° To be distinctive,
the trademark holder must prove that the mark has signifi-
cance beyond that of the association with the product.9' Si-
,7 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A). While some may see distinctiveness and fame
as the same, the Second Circuit has maintained the two as discrete requirements.
See Nabisco, Inc., v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 216 (2d Cir. 1999).
" See Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 189 F.3d 868, 877-80 (9th Cir. 1999)
(finding it to be a mere tautology to ask those already acquainted with the mark
whether it is familiar); E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Oliver Buttex, No. CIV S-98-0907
(E.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 1999) (finding a survey of the public, which pointed to the
word Gallo on CDs and asked participants what words or products they associated
with that word, to be conclusive evidence of the fame of the mark); Hughes, supra
note 85, at 798-801 (discussing the fame requirement). For further discussions on
proving fame in dilution cases, see generally G. Kip Edwards, Developments in
Dilution Law, 579 PLI/PAT 209 (1999).
" See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1)(A)-(G).
90 "[Tlhe First Circuit has made clear that 'a great deal more' is required to
show fame of the mark than to show the secondary meaning required for infringe-
ment protection." Hasbro, Inc. v. Clue Computing, Inc., 66 F. Supp. 2d 117, 131
(D. Mass. 1999) (quoting I.P. Lund Trading ApS v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27, 47
(1st Cir. 1998)); see also Fruit of the Loom, Inc. v. Girouard, 994 F.2d 1359, 1362-
64 (9th Cir. 1993) (stating that while the exact degree of fame is unknown, the
strength of the mark must at least be "mature and well-known" and at least some
subliminal association must exist between the mark of the infringer and the trade-
mark holder).
9' See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 25 (1995); see also H.R.
REP. No. 104-374, at 4 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1031 (endors-
ing the view of dilution as the debilitation of the potency of the mark).
To explain the difference between distinctive and famous marks, it is first
necessary to review the four categories of marks. Those categories are generic,
descriptive, suggestive, and arbitrary and fanciful. See Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v.
Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d. Cir. 1976). Generic marks are ineligible
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multaneously, to satisfy the fame requirement, the trademark
owner must prove that the mark has achieved a level of re-
nown unknown by most trademarks. Thus, in earlier cases,
only the most well known marks could receive protection on
this basis. In Sporty's Farm, this meant that while Kodak or
IBM is likely to be protected, Sporty's would not require or
deserve such protection absent more exhaustive analysis. Not
even Columbia University, which is known by many around
the world and probably earns revenues greater than Sporty's,
could get protection under the dilution statute. In fact, the
court held that the Columbia University Hospital in Texas was
too remote to be considered related.92 Therefore, it can be ar-
gued that the court in Sporty's Farm was not so much protect-
ing the fame of the Sporty's mark, but in an act performed by
many courts before, it was attempting to punish cybersquatters
under the FTDA by deciding whether the intent seems to be to
target the same customers.93
In the past, the Second Circuit has been reluctant to find
any mark sufficiently famous to warrant dilution protection. As
recently as 1989, a panel refused to believe that the LEXIS
legal services mark was sufficiently famous to warrant dilution
protection from a new line of automobiles called Lexus."4 The
panel stated that although the LEXIS mark is known, it is
only a famous mark to a discrete group-lawyers and accoun-
for protection. Id. Descriptive marks refer to some quality related to the product
such as Red Beer. Id. at 10. Suggestive marks refer to marks that have taken on
some other connotative meaning, for example, Softee Tissue Paper. Id. at 10-11.
Finally, arbitrary or fanciful marks are the strongest marks that exist; they have
no related meaning to the product, like Xerox copiers or Quaker oatmeal. Id. at
11. Only suggestive, arbitrary, and fanciful marks qualify as distinctive.
Abercrombie & Fitch Co., 537 F.2d at 11.
". For proof that a world famous mark may not be entitled to dilution protec-
tion due to consistent third party use, see Trustees of Columbia Univ. v. Colum-
bia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 964 F. Supp. 733, 745 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (citing to the
use of the word "Columbia" in reference to many businesses, including several
health-related services); see also New York Stock Exch., Inc. v. New York, New
York Hotel, LLC, 69 F. Supp. 2d 479, 490-94 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (holding that NYSE
was not distinctive enough to merit dilution protection). But see Lexington Mgmt.
Corp. v. Lexington Capital Partners, 10 F. Supp. 2d 271, 289-90 (S.D.N.Y. 1998)
(granting a preliminary injunction to plaintiff stating that its mark appears to be
sufficiently famous and distinctive to merit dilution protection).
3 See Lund, 163 F.3d at 50.
', See Mead Data Cent., Inc., v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 875 F.2d
1026, 1031-32 (2d Cir. 1989).
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tants-and therefore it does not have sufficient strength in the
market to be famous because only one percent of the general
population is aware of it.95 The court then held that the Lexus
mark did not dilute the legal service's mark based on both lack
of renown of the mark and the lack of predatory intent."
In Sporty's Farm, the trademark was likely only to be
known to the discrete market of aviation enthusiasts. In fact,
the court found significance in the roughly $50 million a year
in company retail sales.97 If the basis for fame is yearly reve-
nue, LEXIS legal services could have satisfied the burden with
net earnings of $50.4 million.9" Perhaps the historic rigidity of
the famousness standard is what led the Sporty's Farm court,
without commenting on the mark's renown, to agree immedi-
ately with the lower court's opinion that the mark was distinc-
tive.9 However, the speed with which the court determined
distinctiveness and the utter disregard of the importance of
fame in keeping dilution from expanding property rights re-
mains disturbing because such an analysis seems completely
out of line with the discrete category of marks that dilution
was initially intended to protect."'
"5 "The strength and distinctiveness of Lexis is limited to the market for its
services-attorneys and accountants. Outside that market, Lexis has very little
selling power. Because only one percent of the general population associates Lexis
with the attributes of Mead's service, it cannot be said that Lexis identifies that
service to the general public . .. ." Id. at 1031.
"G Predatory intent is a phrase used to refer to bad faith use under the FTDA.
The Mead factor test that arose from the LEXIS case seems to have met its de-
mise in Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., where the court stated that requiring
proof of actual consummated dilution was "an arbitrary and unwarranted limita-
tion on the methods of proof." Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 223.
See Sporty's Farm, 202 F.3d at 493.
98 Based on Mead Corporation's 10K report for the fiscal year 1993 on
FreeEdgar, net earnings were listed at $50.4 million for that year. See Mead
Corporation's 10K Report for 1993, available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/-
data/64394/0000064394-94-000010.txt.
" "We agree that sporty's. is a 'distinctive' mark. As a result, and without
casting any doubt on the district court's holding in this respect, we need not, and
hence do not, decide whether sporty's is also a 'famous' mark." Sporty's Farm, 202
F.3d at 497.
100 "As a general matter, a trademark is sufficiently distinctive to be diluted by
a nonconforming use if the mark retains its source significance when encountered
outside the context of the goods and services with which it is used by the trade-
mark owner." MCCARTHY, supra note 17, at § 24.92 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 25, cmt. (e) (1995)). This means that marks based on
generic terms like "sporty's" or "apple" would not receive dilution protection absent
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The story of dilution is circular; it concludes as it began.
The difficulty with the expansion of the dilution doctrine goes
beyond the problems of the ACPA. These concerns have existed
since the enactment of dilution protection in 1995. Rather than
following the original legislative intent that dilution protection
be reserved for the "limited category" of nationally recognized
marks whose enormous value would be irreparably harmed by
"promiscuous use,"'' courts have continuously disposed of
the fame requirement in little more than a few sentences or,
with the skills of contortionists, found fame where none exist-
ed."°2 Ultimately, dilution protection has proven to be a long
fall down a very slippery slope, and the latest incarnation, as
represented by the ACPA, may prove to be its last because
there is nowhere to go from here.
B. Concurrent Use
In trademark law classes around the country, professors
are discussing the issue of how the Internet, without any geo-
graphic boundaries, is limited by the fact that it cannot accom-
modate concurrent use of a mark. Concurrent use allows for
simultaneous use of a mark in two situations: distinct product
markets or geographic areas.0 3 For the former, the constraint
is that the product markets must remain distinct. Therefore, in
real space, one has Dell books and Dell computers, but it is
questionable who gets the domain address www.dell.com. °4
a showing that the general public associated the word with the good or service to
which the mark applied. This was the losing point made by Sporty's Farm at the
district court level. See Sporty's Farm, No. 3:96CV0756, slip op. at 15.
... See The United States Trademark Association Trademark Review Commission
Report and Recommendation to the USTA President and Board of Directors, 77
TRADEMARK REP. 375, 455 (1987).
102 Brendan Mahaffey-Dowd, Note, Famous Trademarks: Ordinary Inquiry by the
Courts of Marks Entitled to an Extraordinary Remedy, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 423,
435-442 (1998); see also Gazette Newspapers, Inc. v. New Paper, Inc., 934 F. Supp.
688, 696-97 (D. Md. 1996) (finding "Gazette" to be famous and distinctive).
10 See Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 416-19 (1916)
104 In a real-life example, Gateway 2000, the billion-dollar computer corporation,
attempted to sue Gateway.com, Inc., a small company that existed at least six
years before Gateway 2000. Gateway 2000, despite being the company of greater
success and larger clientele, lost because both companies had a legitimate claim on
the name and it was simply given on a first-come, first-served basis. See Lawrence
Siskind, Addressing the Net, LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 6, 1997, at 16.
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Is the answer as simple as who was the first to register the
domain or the mark? In real space, the senior user/registrant
can force the junior user to abandon the mark if he chooses to
branch out into the junior registrant's geographic region."'
This would be the situation of the hypothetical Darling Donuts
of New York and Darling Bakery & Flour Mill of California,
who sell similar products. If Darling Donuts, the senior regis-
trant, wanted to open a shop in Los Angeles, Darling Bakery
would be forced to surrender the name to the entrants. Howev-
er, the issue on the Internet is not so clear because of the glob-
al exclusivity of domain names. If one owns the Blue Note
Club in Missouri, is one now forced to turn over
www.bluenote.com to the unaffiliated Blue Note Club in New
York?10
6
It is often argued that there are simple solutions to the
problem of concurrent use on the web. One of the most com-
mon suggestions is to create a site directory that lists all
websites bearing the same name. Thus, when one types in
www.dell.com, all eleven businesses or persons legitimately
using the address will pop up on the screen, and the individual
can choose which site he or she is looking for. In theory, this is
a great idea, but the problem may be summed up in an Abbott
and Costello analogy-who's on first? It is difficult to conceive
of which company name would be placed on the top of the list.
Of course, the senior registrant could, and perhaps should, go
first on that list, but there is often a distinction between the
" " 'Since it is the trade, and not the mark, that is to be protected, a trade-
mark acknowledges no territorial boundaries .... But the mark, of itself, cannot
travel to markets where there is no article to wear the badge and no trader to
offer the article.' " Hanover, 240 U.S. at 416 (allowing both an Ohio firm and an
Alabama firm to use the "Tea Rose" name on flour because of geographically dis-
tinct markets and good faith use) (quoting Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Allen &
Wheeler Co., 208 F. 513, 519 (7th Cir. 1913); see also Dawn Donut Co., v. Harts
Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358, 365 (2d Cir. 1959) (concluding that even though
plaintiff-registrant sells baked goods and mixes nationally and infringer sells baked
goods in New York, because plaintiff does not sell products in New York, concur-
rent use is allowed); Burger Igng of Fla., Inc., v. Hoots, 403 F.2d 904, 906-09 (7th
Cir. 1968) (allowing Hoots to use the "Burger King" mark in Illinois until Burger
King enters the market, at which time the mark belongs to the trademark holder).
" This was exactly the question facing the Second Circuit in Bensusan Restau-
rant Corp. v. King. There, the case turned on the jurisdictional grounds that there
was no solicitation of business by the Missouri club in New York via its website.
126 F.3d 25 (2d Cir. 1997).
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senior registrant and user.
For example, Amazon.com, the senior registrant of the
Amazon mark, briefly fretted in 1999 over a case that pitted it
against the senior user of the mark, a feminist bookstore using
www.amazon.com.gr.0 7 The bookstore had been in existence
and had been using the name Amazon since the 1970s. Howev-
er, Amazon.com applied for registration of the name in 1994
and received the trademark in 1997.10 This presents another
problem for the Act, namely, the question of how detailed the
level of research should be before one considers the registra-
tion to be in good faith? One attorney commented that the
Amazon bookstore had been listed in the Dunn & Bradstreet
database, which provides information on international and
U.S. businesses since 1990.'09 As a result, one may argue
that Amazon.com should have never chosen that name because
of prior notice of the name's use to identify similar goods and
services."'
Another difficulty presented by this solution is a situation
where, for example, Dell books is the senior registrant but peo-
ple normally do not visit its site."' If we know that most peo-
ple surfing the web are looking for Dell computers, should it
not be on the top of the list? Moreover, there are consider-
ations of commercial appeal and money given to browsers to
rank sites in a given order. This directory system approach is
not necessarily an appealing idea to businesses or users be-
cause, while customers may be diverted in their search for a
book, when a list comes up, thoughts of the money they saved
up for the new computer dance in their heads. Before the un-
suspecting browser knows it, three hours have passed, she has
been looking at a lot of different sites, and she realizes that
she did not get the one item or piece of information that she
was looking for, but now she no longer has the time to look for
it. There is also the risk of a proliferation of sites selling vari-
ous goods in an attempt to capitalize on the most frequently
hit addresses."' Of course, much of this problem is eliminat-
" ".gr" is the country code abbreviation used on the web to designate Greece.
.. See Steven Andersen, It's Amazon Versus Amazon in Mark Battle, 9 CoRpo-
RATE LEGAL TIMES 64, 64 n.95 (Oct. 1999).
" See id.
110 Id.
. This once again presents a Gateway problem. See supra note 104.
11 "-it" is a technological term of art referring to the looking up of a particu-
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ed with the statute's intent requirement, which provides for a
good faith selection of the name.' Alternatively, anyone who
has ever done a search on the web knows that pages and pages
of results can be found. Assuming that most search engines
base the number of its per page on what they believe the
average browser will read, tech-savvy Uncle Dell's webpage is
in a precarious situation if it takes the last spot on the list.
Another solution offered to address the problem of
concurrent use is the opening up of more generic top-level do-
mains ("gTLDs")." 4 This would allow website addresses to be
attached to a wider variety of terms such as .forpresident,
.microsoft, or .personal. In 1996, a private company,
Name.Space, proposed doing just that."' However, its efforts
were ill-timed as they fell shortly before the Secretary of Com-
merce, at President Clinton's behest, investigated the NSI mo-
nopoly and ways to open access to domains given the growing
complaints both within and outside of this country."' On
September 30, 1998, NSI's contract with the government ex-
pired, ending its long rein as the exclusive registrar of domain
names."7 In preparation for the expiration, and realizing the
growing frustration with government administration, the feder-
al government decided to privatize the Internet and the do-
main name system."8 These concerns, as enunciated in the
Department of Commerce's White Paper on the Management of
Internet Names and Addresses, can be summarized as follows:
(1) dissatisfaction with the absence of competition in domain
name registration; (2) a growing number of conflicts between
trademark holders and domain name holders; (3) the call for a
lar website.
113 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B) (2000) (describing elements of bad faith).
114 Top-level domains refer to the suffix for the address that indicates a com-
mon spoke of origination, such as .com or .uk. There are currently seven gTLDs:
.com, .net, .org, .edu, .gov, .int, and .mil. See Name.Space Inc. v. Network Solu-
tions, Inc., 202 F.3d 573, 577 (2d Cir. 2000). The Internet Corporation for As-
signed Names and Numbers is currently working on expanding the amount of
gTLDs. See FAQ on Generic Top Level Domains, at http:J/www.icann.org/general/-
faql.htm.
"1 Name.Space, Inc., 202 F.3d at 578.
116 Id.
117 White Paper, 63 Fed. Reg. at 31,742.
118 For a good explanation of the reasoning behind privatization of the Internet,
see generally Henry H. Perritt Jr., International Administrative Law for the
Internet: Mechanisms of Accountability, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 871 (Summer 1999).
[Vol. 66: 2
2000] SPORTY'S FARM: DOMMN NAME REGULATION GONE AWRY 445
more formal management structure of the web by commercial
entities; (4) increasing use of the Internet by those outside the
U.S.; (5) withholding of decisions about new gTLDs due to the
lack of public accountability regarding decision-making; and (6)
increased commercial use making it less appropriate for U.S.
research agencies to direct and fund the functions of the
web.
1 1 9
This expansion is part of the solution brokered by the
government in its attempt to simultaneously privatize and
internationalize the domain name system. However, the expan-
sion is being phased in slowly, and it can only serve as part of
the solution. There are also entrenchment issues to address, as
American businesses and individuals have dominated the most
highly valued of the gTLDs-.com. It is unclear whether the
other six gTLDs would remain the most coveted under the
revised system or whether Americans may be forced onto the
newer top-level domains, such as .nom, info, and .store, to
free-up .com and .org (the exceptionally-valued domains) for
truly commercial practices.'
This solution goes hand in hand with the international
proposition that Americans increase their use of their country
code Top Level Domain ("ccTLD") in order to create space in
the other gTLDs. Thus, MyName.com will become MyName.us
or MyName.com.us. This is not a perfect solution, but it goes a
long way toward easing the growing international sentiment
that the United States is dominating the Internet by requiring
everyone except its own registrants to use a country code iden-
tifier as part of the gTLD.12'
Although nothing in the Act states this, it appears that
granting the trademark holder the right to the website bearing
11' White Paper, 63 Fed. Reg. at 31,742.
1.. On November 16, 2000, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and
Numbers approved the use of seven new domains: .info, .biz, .pro, .name,
.museum, .aero, and .coop. See Chris Gaither, 7 Domains to Compete With .com,
N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 17, 2000, at C7, available at 2000 WL 31299263. It is too early
to tell how this will change the Internet playing field. The domains will not be
put into use until the spring of 2001 and will have to contend with the entrench-
ment issues mentioned above. Businesses will be reluctant to use the new do-
mains, and consumers will be even slower to search those sites.
121 For a discussion of international resentment about U.S. domination of .com,
see Wendy Grossman, Connected: Lords of Their Domain Set for Identity Crisis,
DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Nov. 11, 1997, at 12.
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its mark gives more than just the .com site, which signals that
the site is for commercial use. Case law indicates that the
mark owner is entitled to addresses in all the top-level do-
mains. 22 Moreover, because domain names are just represen-
tations of alphanumeric strings, trademark law has been ex-
panded to vesting interest in number codes across the Internet.
If so, in one fell swoop, all of the web's potential, which to
many individuals exemplifies the last bastion of freedom, has
been eliminated. Instead, one has to put the web firmly in the
hands of commerce by giving businesses a property right far
greater than that ever intended. It will be in the courts' hands
to recognize this expansion and force back the reach of intellec-
tual property into its intended realm. While Congress may be
entitled to create whatever property rights it wants in the
United States, because of the global exclusivity of domain
names, the effects of Congress' legislation are far reaching and
encroach on other countries' abilities to provide solutions."
IV. REGULATION: NOT IF, BUT How CAN THERE BE INTERNET
REGULATION?
The overreaching of mark holders illuminates the next
issue of whether it is too late for legislation, such as the ACPA,
to be effective on the Internet. Many believe that there is no
such thing as Internet regulation. But the real issue, as the
rest of the wired world slowly discerns, is that the United
States is regulating the web without the knowledge or permis-
sion of Internet users around the world, and the significance of
that discovery is only now being appreciated.
Although many countries argue over which country was
the birthplace of the Internet, there is little doubt that the
development of the web was sparked by the expansion in the
12 The two website owners who were represented in the Porsche Cars North
America, Inc. v. Porsche.com suit were Porsche.net and Porscheclub.net. 51 F.
Supp. 2d 707, 710 (E.D. Va. 1999). In Sporty's Farm, Judge Calabresi also stated,
"Nothing prevents an American commercial entity from seeking to use the .org or
.us top level domains, but, especially in the United States, it has become custom-
ary for commercial web pages to use .com." 202 F.3d at 493 n.3.
1 See Rebecca W. Gole, Note, Playing the Name Game: A Glimpse at the Fu-
ture of the Internet Domain Name System, 51 FED. COMM. L.J. 403, 409 (1999)
(discussing the forty-two classes of trademarks that exist in the American state
and federal systems alone versus those of countries worldwide).
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United States of the Advanced Research Projects Agency Net-
work ("Arpanet") for civilian use." 4 While many have argued
that the Internet cannot be regulated, the federal government's
legislation produced from 1990 to 1999, and the growth of the
web, tell a much different story. American rules have prevailed
in the development of the Internet because the United States
was its first regulator and is the home of the corporations and
businesses that dominate the Internet."2
A. Early Regulatory Efforts: U.S. Domination
There were very few people in the world like Dennis
Toeppen, who saw the Internet's future as being the billion-
dollar industry it is today. When the government realized that
the Department of Defense's pet project may have some com-
mercial use, the National Science Foundation rapidly contract-
ed with NSI to register domains to the public. 26 Very
quickly, the few registrations handled per day became such a
dynamic business that NSI requested that it be allowed to
charge $100 per registrant to cover the costs of hiring more
than the two employees initially assigned to facilitate
registration.'27 Shortly thereafter, the lawsuits began, as
companies confronted those who both legitimately and illegiti-
mately registered domain names similar to their brand names.
After some time, the battle was not just between regis-
trants. Indeed, at least one company decided to sue NSI for
allowing someone else to register its trademark. 2 ' After this
incident, NSI became skittish, although it had prevailed inso-
far as the courts had ruled that registrars could not be held
responsible for the infringement. Consequently, NSI decided to
124 Arpanet is the name of the packet-switching technology and communications
networks established by the Department of Defense's Advanced Research Projects
Agency ("DARPA7).
12 See generally Yochai Benkler, Net Regulation: Taking Stock and Looking
Forward, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 1203 (2000) (surveying all congressional legislation
concerning the Internet from 1990 to 1999).
.2 U.S. Dep't. of Commerce, Management of Domain Names and Addresses,
Statement of Policy, 63 Fed. Reg. 31,741-01, at 03 (June 10, 1998), available at
1998 WL 298883.
127 Litman, supra note 79, at 150.
IS See Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 949
(C.D. Cal. 1997), affd, 194 F.3d 980 (9th Cir. 1999).
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create a system by which all registrants had to indemnify NSI
against any future trademark claims. This indemnification
policy allowed for NSI, upon thirty days notice, to withdraw
the registration of a domain if the trademark holder presented
a valid certificate at the time of his or her complaint to
NSI. 29 This created legal chaos, as the floodgates for e-com-
merce opened and trademark holders beat down the doors of
NSI to "reclaim" their domains. In the meantime, domain reg-
istrants were filing injunctions against NSI to prevent their
websites from being shut down. After hundreds of out of court
settlements, questionable litigation, and millions of dollars,
everyone (including registrants, corporations, and the govern-
ment) believed that the solution was simply to get rid of NSI
and to assign registration to more efficient businesses. 3
Thus, in September 1998, NSI ceased to be the lone regis-
trar of domain names and the maintainer of the master root
zone server. 1' Since then, due to the complaints of private
corporations and foreign countries,'32 the United States has
allowed other American companies and, to a more limited ex-
tent, foreign companies, to register domain names. 33 While
this may sound insignificant, it is important to note that the
United States was the clearinghouse for all domain names, and
it exerted eminent domain, to a limited extent, over the web by
creating its own authority to parcel out the task of registering
web addresses in a manner similar to that in which the regu-
lation of spectrum began. Now, as Congress attempts to tight-
... See Comment, Developments-The Domain Name System: A Case Study of
the Significance of Norms to Internet Governance, 11 HARV. L. REV. 1657, 1664
(1999) [hereinafter Developments].
13 Congress referred to these pre-ACPA attempts to prosecute cybersquatters as
"expensive and uncertain." H.R. REP. NO. 106-412, at 6 (1999).
... The master root zone server refers to the domain name hierarchy system
that uses the seven top-level domain names: .com, .net, .org, .edu, .gov, .int, and
.mil. There are also over 240 country code top-level domains, such as .us, .uk, and
.fr. NSI has been empowered with these functions since 1993. See Cooperative
Agreement No. NCR-9218742; National Science Foundation Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1861
et seq. (1999).
" Name.Space Inc. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 202 F.3d 573, 578 (2d Cir. 2000)
("In recent years, there has been an increasingly contentious debate, both within
the U.S. and internationally, over the addition of new gTLDs to the Internet."); see
also White Paper, 63 Fed. Reg. at 31,743.
" See Marcus J. Millet, Same Game in a New Domain: Some Trademark Is-
sues on the Internet, 198 N.J. LAW. 32, 36-37 (1999).
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en regulation of registration in the United States through in
rem procedures, and as server-based jurisdiction takes
root,"' companies will likely flee to foreign registrars.'35
Furthermore, many foreign companies felt disadvantaged
due to years of United States control of .com domain name
registration. While there is some basic agreement among coun-
tries concerning trademark law," 6 if the new U.S. law is up-
holding the broadest possible property right, what happens
when both Amazon.gr and Amazon.com booksellers clash?" 7
While this scenario would clearly be within the bounds of the
ACPA or pure dilution theory, it is unclear whether the law is
enforceable in foreign courts, and under whose jurisdiction the
matter would be litigated. For example, Greece may be unwill-
ing to grant such broad property rights if the name was regis-
tered locally. This is an issue of substantial import, although
Internet lawyers and advocates seem reluctant to address it.
Under the now ancien regime of NSI, all .com names had to be
registered in the United States and at least some form of mini-
mal contact with the country was necessary to sue infringers
in American courts. Now, with France, Belgium, and England
all registering domains, it is unclear which law, if any, ap-
plies." Therefore, while it has generally been hailed as bene-
' See infra notes 136-139 and accompanying text.
135 Millet, supra note 133, at 37.
... Courts in the U.K. and France have also held that cybersquatting violates
valid trademarks. See Marks & Spencer PLC v. One in a Million, Oh. 1997, M
5403 (High Court of Justice, Chancery Division, 20 Nov. 1997); Soc'y Coop.
Agricole Champagne Cereales v. G.J. (Tribunal de Grande Instance, April 14,
1998), available in STUCKNEY, INTERNET AND ON-LINE LAW 7-54 (1998); see also
Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including
Trade in Counterfeit Goods of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 33
INTL LEGAL MATERIALS J. 1, 83-111 (1994) art. 15-21.
1" Conflicts such as this one are only likely to increase in the coming years as
two unrelated, non-infringing businesses in separate countries compete for
"thebusiness.com" website.
1" There are a multitude of international agreements that now include, or are
used to protect, the use of trademarks as domains. See Beth Fulkerson, Theft by
Territorialism: A Case for Revising TRIPS to Protect Trademarks from National
Market Foreclosure, 17 MICH. J. INTL. L. 801, 803 (1996); Paris Convention for the
Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, 21 U.S.T. 1629, art. 4(A)(1), 6
bis., 10 bis. (revised July 14, 1967); General Agreement on Tariffs And
Trade-Multilateral Trade Negotiations (Uruguay Round): Agreement on Trade-Re-
lated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods
("TRIPS"), Dec. 15, 1993, art. 16; North American Free Trade Agreement, Free
Trade L. Rep. (CCH) Special Rep. No. 39, extra ed. Art. 1708; European Commu-
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ficia] to break NSI's stranglehold on the registration process, it
is unclear whether Congress and the executive branch have
acted too quickly to that extent.
What seems likely to happen (at least for a few months
until the next set of web innovations are born) is a two-tiered
system where countries that currently have the most to lose
due to the heightened protection of trademarks sign an agree-
ment and those still far from reaping the benefits of the elec-
tronic goldmine are simply shut out as entrants to the registra-
tion system. This further entrenches the suspicions that most
of the world currently holds towards the development of the
web-that it is an American invention meant to shut the rest
of the world out of the economic benefits to be reaped.
Dismantling NSI's monopoly has not and will not produce the
desired efficiency or effectiveness to domain name registration.
Instead, the end result will likely be legal chaos as the pres-
sures to invoke in rem jurisdiction and the problems with for-
eign registrants surface. Dominating this legal quandary are
questions of who, what, and notably where to sue. These issues
set the stage for the Internet regulation of the future.
B. Regulation of the Future?: The ICANN Solution
The lack of consistent legislation and a cogent vision for
Internet regulation leads to the most troubling aspect of this
picture-the not-for-profit, non-governmental organization that
was created to lead us out of the proverbial DNS darkness, the
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
("ICANN"). ICANN was formulated in 1998 to administer the
network addressing system." 9 Almost immediately, ICANN
nity First Council Directive 89/104/EEC, 1989 O.J. (L 40) 1. Nonetheless, cases
handled by different countries have had widely divergent results. See, e.g., Prince
PLC v. Prince Sports Group, ch. 2355 (1997) (upholding the U.K. common law
right for Prince Information Technology to use the prince.com domain even though
Prince Sports Group held the trademark in both the U.S. and the UK); Nicholas
R. Simmons, Master of Your Domain, LOS ANGELES LAWYER 46 (Oct. 1999) (using
a first-to-register rationale, a Brazilian court held that aol.com.br did not belong to
America OnLine, but rather it belonged to an unrelated Brazilian company called
America Online Telecommunications) (citing http://www.wired.com/news/politics/-
story/19918.html).
... Jeri Clausing, A Campaign to Get Out the Vote for the Internet Oversight
Board, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2000, at C12.
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suffered from an array of difficulties, not the least of which
were legitimacy and continuity. Heading this new corporation
and overseeing the domain name system was Dr. Jon Postel, a
student and one of the original members of the group that
created Arpanet. He had since run, almost single-handedly, the
Internet Assigned Numbers Authority ("IANA"), which admin-
istered the Internet. Dr. Postel became one of the most respect-
ed men in his field, and he was involved in several organiza-
tions that attempted to formulate a more practical and lasting
structure for the Internet.40 As a result, ICANN's legitimacy
as an organization relied on the Internet community's most re-
spected member taking the helm. Anticipating future events,
one of Dr. Postel's colleagues stated that such heavy reliance
on any one individual rendered the system inherently unsta-
ble, as all that held the system together was Postel's force of
personality."' Postel died from complications related to heart
sugery soon after he proposed ICANN, an organization that he
referred to as "unique in the world-a non-governmental orga-
nization with significant responsibilities for administering
what is becoming an important global resource," and ICANN
was submitted to and accepted by Congress.'
Postel's death threw the organization into turmoil, as the
loss of his guidance led the board of directors to take a number
of ill-considered actions that were condemned by the interna-
tional community." ICANN has overcome its initial shock
from the loss of its leader. However, it has still not managed to
gain respect. Esther Dyson, the interim chairwoman of the
corporation, has proved to be less of a politician than her pre-
decessor. In fact, she incensed the Internet community with
her approach to everything from board elections to the "jet-set"
fashion that many perceive the meetings of the board to re-
flect, with a different continent and country serving as host to
its meetings every three months.'"
"4 See Developments, supra note 129, at 1660-61.
141 See Interview by Jonathan Zittrain with David Clark, Senior Research Scien-
tist, Advanced Networking Department, Laboratory of Computer Science,
Massachussetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Mass. (Oct. 1, 1997), available
at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/fallsem97/trans/clark.
1' See Keith Perine, Throwing Rocks at ICANN, THE INDUSTRY STANDARD, Apr.
3, 2000, at 114.
143 Id.
144 See Jeri Clausing, A Leader in Cyberspace, It Seems, Is No Politician, N.Y.
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However, while many argued with the semantics of
ICANN's other policies, there was almost universal agreement
that its Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy
("UDRP") was a vast improvement upon its NSI predecessor.
Three key differences between the two policies existed. First,
under the UDRP, trademark owners were no longer allowed to
hold domain names pending a dispute resolution. Second, un-
less the domain name was being held in bad faith, the
trademark holder could not invoke the UDRP proceedings.145
Finally, the mandatory dispute resolution system for bad faith
domain name holders allowed for resolution of the dispute in
less than forty-five days, occurred online, and cost approxi-
mately $1,000 in fees to be paid for by the trademark owner
bringing the dispute.146
UDRP was inaugurated on January 14, 2000, when the
World Intellectual Property Organization (the "WIPO") Arbi-
tration and Mediation Center implemented UDRP's first suc-
cess. The World Wrestling Federation attempted to recover the
name worldwrestlingfederation.com from a squatter. 47 Both
sides appeared to be pleased with the results because the pro-
cess took less than forty days and the legal costs totaled be-
tween $2,000 and $3,000. Ultimately, the cybersquatter was
forced to relinquish the domain name, but he appeared to be
pleased that the dispute "did not cost [him] a dime." 14
However, several problems remain despite UDRP's initial
success. First, the use of UDRP does not prevent the claimants
from pursuing litigation.1 4 1 Second, many still conceive of
ICANN as an American or Western construction to dominate
the Internet. 5 ° Third, there still remains an overall lack of
TIES, Apr. 10, 2000, at C1.
14 This eliminates some reverse-hijacking problems.
14. See Luke A. Walker, ICANN's Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution
Policy, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 289, 299-300 (2000).
" See World Wrestling Fed'n Entm't, Inc. v. Michael Bosman, WIPO case No.
D 99-0001 § 4 (1999) (Donahey, Arb.).
" See World Wrestling Fed'n Entm't, Inc., WIPO Case No. D99-0001 § 4; see
also Jeri Clausing, International Panel Resolves First Domain Dispute, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 14, 2000, at B10 (comparing UDRP with traditional litigation battles over
domain names and estimating that the costs for a simple federal civil court dis-
pute were between $10,000 and $15,000).
1.. See generally BroadBridge Media, L.L.C. v. Hypercd.com, 106 F. Supp. 2d
505 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
11O See Perine, supra note 142, at 115.
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confidence in the corporation's ability to effectively administer
the domain name system.'51 Indeed, some have questioned
the legitimacy of creating an organization to deal with regula-
tory problems and have wondered to whom ICANN an-
swers. 5 2 Finally, with the ACPA's passage, it seems that
Congress, without giving ICANN's domain name system a
chance to prove itself, has short-circuited its success by enact-
ing legislation that can be used in a more punitive fashion
against cybersquatters than UDRP and may cause many to
prefer the U.S. court system due to the chance to recoup big
money damages and profits.'53
Lastly, while the Act may solve questions of personal juris-
diction and venue for the United States, the same issue is
likely to be played out over and over again in the international
arena with less successful results. The ACPA appears to en-
trench the idea of server-based jurisdiction, which has been
avoided until this point. As a result, the international effect is
likely to be felt more acutely. For example, in contrast to prior
American control over the domain name system registry, a
Lithuanian cybersquatter can now register business.com in
France, even though there is already a competing American
company. Global exclusivity on the web would force that player
out completely. For example, if you type in Budweiser on your
computer, the results will be both the familiar Anheuser-Busch
brand, budweiser.com, and the Czech Budweiser Company,
budweiser.cz, which has been brewing beer for hundreds of
years. In this case, neither company is a cybersquatter; how-
ever, it is entirely possible for the American Budweiser compa-
,' One commentator noted, "ICANN isn't a world court of justice. It should not
be involved in trademark law." Id. at 117 (referring to whether the "narrow tech-
nical mission" of ICANN is compatible with the need for new intellectual property
law to deal with the issues that the Internet poses).
..2 See Developments, supra note 129, at 1670 (referring to Prof. Lawrence
Lessig's assertion that allowing a corporation to be charged with "the most signifi-
cant new jurisdiction we've known since the Louisiana Purchase" raises constitu-
tional questions that are unacceptable). See generally Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Inter-
national Administrative Law for the Internet: Mechanisms of Accountability, 51
ADmfN. L. REV. 871 (1999) (stating that allowing international regulation of the
Internet to evolve through privatization may be the only way to avoid constitu-
tional issues likely to be invoked).
1"3 Others have also advanced this theory. See Mark Grossman & Allison K.
Hift, Is the Cybersquatting Cure Worse than the Disease, LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 24,
2000, at 24.
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ny to be dragged into the courts of the Czech Republic or
France to defend its use of the name. After all, this is not just
national exclusivity anymore, as trademark was intended, but
global domination.154
These are just some of the more complicated questions
that the ACPA fails to answer. If courts do interpret the Act as
answering the jurisdictional question of where these issues
should be litigated, one concedes the necessity of rewriting this
country's jurisdictional laws from due process on down. In the
end, ICANN is an organization of promise, but not much sub-
stance, in solving these problems."'
CONCLUSION
A wise man once said, "In this great future, you can't for-
get your past."56 The Internet has proffered the perfect back-
drop to analyze the vacuum in which regulation and legislation
are created. It has also made it glaringly obvious that, at least
in the short term, we have quickly failed in heeding the mes-
sage of the proverb. The birth of the Internet has thrown intel-
lectual property law into a tizzy, leaving many scholars to
wonder whether it still exists. The reactions of the old regime
gatekeepers resemble those of any caught in a revolution, at-
tempting to quickly contain it before it spreads. The problem of
domain names alone has sparked the passage of both the
FTDA and the ACPA within a four-year period. To appease the
pantheons of industry, while not arousing the ire of the tech-
nology vanguard, there have been subtle shifts in the law that
have taken extraordinary leaps in new directions while using
the same language of the old laws.
Trademark concepts, like dilution (on which the collective
legal grasp throughout the country has always been tenuously
held), or the even more commonplace concurrent use doctrine,
..4 For a discussion of the jurisdictional issues involved, see Millet, supra note
133, at 36-37.
... That promise is embodied in both the universal need to make their Internet
registration system viable, and the 413 proceedings currently pending before its
arbitrators concerning over 641 domain names. See Statistical Summary of Pro-
ceedings Under Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (June 30, 2000),
available at http://icann.org/udrp/proceedings-stat.htm.
156 Bob Marley, No Woman, No Cry, on NATTY DREAD (Island Records 1974).
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have been reconsidered or displaced in the technological
minefields. The endeavor to both stretch old legal concepts to
meet the needs of the digital age and to create new regimes to
govern the new frontier of cyberspace has led to contradictory
legislative and executive decisions. The bid to release the
American stranglehold on Internet regulation to stimulate the
economic appeal of the medium and soothe international ap-
prehension of U.S. domination has backfired. It is a textbook
exercise in failed revolution: Too much, too soon. While ICANN
stands as a revolutionary model for how to implement global
regulatory efforts, this hollow entity has yet to match the reali-
ty of its idea. Indeed, even its first backer and creator, the U.S.
Congress, is reluctant to test ICANN's powers.
In conclusion, the message of Sporty's Farm is subtle. On
the surface, the legal solutions are obvious. New laws, like the
ACPA, may have detrimental effects on old legal concepts, and
perhaps the need to reflect, rather than react, is necessary.
The case also stands for ignoring the regulatory regimes in-
vented in favor of quick appeasement solutions. In the end, the
case teaches one more about the legislative process than the
future of technological regulation. Alternatively, maybe, it
simply tells society that it is currently ill-equipped to handle
both.

